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CVE-2026-116528: Revoke exposed WooCommerce keys from Chargely

CVE-2026-116528: Revoke exposed WooCommerce keys from Chargely

November 14, 2026

If you run Chargely Free Subscriptions 1.0 or earlier, coordinate with the store administrator to disable the affected plugin and revoke the WooCommerce REST API keys it stored. An unauthenticated REST route exposes its saved consumer key and secret, granting read/write access across the store. WPScan’s advisory reports no known fix (November 14, 2026).

What the advisories establish

WPScan rates CVE-2026-116528 9.1 Critical. Its score links to this CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N. Patchstack lists CVSS 7.5 and a separate Low priority label, also with no official patch. Keep the source with any severity copied into a ticket.

WPScan dates public disclosure to November 12 and its last update to November 13. The CVE record was published on November 14 at 06:00:06 UTC. WPScan says it will publish its proof of concept on February 10, 2027. The reviewed advisories do not establish active exploitation.

Contain the leak and revoke credentials

Check the installed plugin’s name, version and activation status in the WordPress administration interface. Its directory slug is chargely-free-subscriptions-for-woocommerce. Version 1.0 is included in the affected range.

Plan the interruption with whoever manages subscriptions. Deactivating the plugin or revoking its keys may interrupt renewals and connected services. Preserve the subscription data and recovery information; avoid deleting the plugin or its records as a rushed workaround.

  1. Deactivate the affected plugin promptly. Have the administrator verify that it remains inactive, including on other affected stores you manage. Do not re-enable it to test the disclosure route on a working shop.
  2. Identify the WooCommerce REST API keys the plugin stored or used. Record their descriptions and associated users without copying the secrets into tickets, chat or logs. Check whether another integration shares those keys before planning its replacement.
  3. In WooCommerce, open Settings > Advanced > REST API and revoke the potentially exposed keys. WooCommerce documents the key-management screen and its Revoke Key control in the REST API guide. Disabling Chargely does not invalidate credentials an attacker already copied. Creating a new pair while leaving the old one valid leaves that access open.
  4. Issue replacement keys only after containing the leak and selecting a trusted replacement or a confirmed fixed integration. Give each integration its own keys with the minimum permissions it needs. Do not put fresh credentials back into the affected plugin.

Review access logs and unexpected changes to orders, products and customer records during the period the plugin was exposed. Preserve relevant evidence securely. Missing log entries do not prove that keys were never retrieved, and legitimate integrations may explain some API activity.

Verify before restoring service

Ask the developer or hosting provider for a fix that explicitly covers CVE-2026-116528. Neither reviewed advisory names a patched release. A provider-specific patch needs the same confirmation; a generic firewall claim or a newer version number is insufficient.

Confirm that revoked credentials no longer authorize access through the store’s approved validation process, without displaying them in shell history or diagnostic output. Then check normal checkout and subscription workflows with the store administrator before restoring service. These are recommended checks, not tests performed for this article.

Updating packages on the Linux host does not repair this WordPress plugin. Keep ordinary server maintenance separate from the plugin fix and credential revocation.

Inspect the public record from Linux

This example downloads public advisory metadata. It never contacts a store or reads API keys. It requires Bash, curl and Python 3. Create a scratch directory and keep the same terminal session for cleanup. Stop if directory creation or changing into it fails.

advisory_dir=$(mktemp -d ./chargely-advisory.XXXXXX) &&
cd -- "$advisory_dir"

Save this source as inspect-chargely-record.py:

import json
from pathlib import Path
import sys

record = json.loads(Path(sys.argv[1]).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
metadata = record["cveMetadata"]
if metadata["cveId"] != "CVE-2026-116528":
    raise SystemExit("Expected CVE-2026-116528")
cna = record["containers"]["cna"]
print("CVE:", metadata["cveId"])
print("CNA:", metadata["assignerShortName"])
print("Published (UTC):", metadata["datePublished"])
for product in cna["affected"]:
    for version in product["versions"]:
        if version["status"] == "affected":
            print("Affected upper bound:", version["lessThanOrEqual"], "(inclusive)")
print("CNA CVSS metrics:", "present" if cna.get("metrics") else "not provided")
print("Metadata only; no WordPress site was inspected.")

Download the CVE record and run the helper:

curl --fail --silent --show-error --max-time 30 \
  'https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-116528' \
  --output chargely-cve.json &&
python3 inspect-chargely-record.py chargely-cve.json

Actual output on Debian 13 with Python 3.12.14, November 14, 2026:

CVE: CVE-2026-116528
CNA: WPScan
Published (UTC): 2026-11-14T06:00:06.339Z
Affected upper bound: 1.0 (inclusive)
CNA CVSS metrics: not provided
Metadata only; no WordPress site was inspected.

The downloaded CNA JSON has no CVSS metrics field; the scores above come from the advisory pages. The helper checks this record’s metadata, not your installed version or exposure.

If you need the JSON for incident records, save a copy and its retrieval date elsewhere before cleanup; the live record can change. From the scratch directory in the same terminal session, this optional cleanup removes only the two example files and their empty directory:

rm -- inspect-chargely-record.py chargely-cve.json &&
cd .. &&
rmdir -- "$advisory_dir" &&
unset advisory_dir

The setup and cleanup commands completed without output. No WordPress instance, exploit, plugin change or credential revocation was tested.

This post was created with assistance from AI.

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